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INTRODUCTION
The law’s use of the terms “reasonable” and “unreasonable” are legion and
notorious. Indeed, the law’s seemingly carefree attitude in throwing around
these terms has often served Legal Realists and their descendants well in
their effort to depict legal language as simply a shell through which actors
exercise the widest sort of discretion to select their favored outcomes or
policies. Conversely, ambitious agendas from philosophers and economists
have often found that “reasonableness” provides a readily available anchor
in the positive law for their normative theories. Work by moral and political
philosophers devoted to analyzing “the reasonable” and work by economists,
decision theorists, and game theorists on rationality understandably turn the
law’s use of “reasonableness” into a magnet for legal theory. In these
respects, “reasonableness” might be seen as the third “r” of legal theory.
Like “rights” and “responsibility,” “reasonableness” is beloved by legal
theorists and equally beloved by the skeptics who spend their time skewering those theorists.
However tempting it is to join one side or the other in these jurisprudential wars, it is useful to step back and do some legwork on the place of
the reasonable within the law, and more specifically, on the variety of places
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that “reasonable” and its cognates are found in the law. Hohfeld and many
since him have found what I might call “varietal analysis” useful in
exploring the concept of rights,1 as did Hart within the concept of responsibility.2 If exploration of the varieties of reasonableness in the law were to
provide even a fraction of the illumination generated by their work on the
other two “r”s, the enterprise will have been worthwhile.3
There is, of course, an irony in my suggested sequence of research. The
word “reasonable” is a paradigmatic example of a standard in the law, and its
meaning is, if nothing else, vague. And—as intimated above—that is why it
is so tempting to reach to legal, philosophical, and economic theories to
flesh out some content for “the reasonable” when content is needed.4 It thus
seems odd—backwards, even—to turn to legal doctrine to try to illuminate
reasonableness.
My reasons for looking at doctrine relate to a suspicion that legal
scholars with a theoretical proclivity have too quickly conflated three quite
different attributes of the language of reasonableness in the law: the attribute of vagueness, the attribute of meaninglessness, and the attribute of ambiguity. For a term or a phrase to fall short of clarity because of vagueness is
quite different from having no meaning at all, and both are different from
having multiple meanings—being ambiguous. A failure to distinguish
among these features of meaning can distort our view of the relevant
domain of law. Indeed, the failure to recognize the multiple ambiguity of
“reasonableness” can lead to a distorted view of its vagueness and unclarity
in the law.
Candor requires me to reveal that I too come with a special interest in,
and theoretical agenda for, one particular occurrence of a “reasonableness”
cognate in the law: reasonableness in negligence law. Most tort theory
debates about reasonableness in negligence law focus on the question of
whether the Hand Formula conception of unreasonable risk—deriving from
earlier work by Henry Terry5—should be understood in a utilitarian or
1 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
2 See generally H.L.A. Hart, Varieties of Responsibility, 83 L. Q. REV. 346 (1967).
3 Sir Neil MacCormick undertook a similar project in one of his last American publications.
See Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1576 (1999)
(exploring the concept of “reasonable” throughout the law). MacCormick put forth a rationalistic
and homogeneous set of analyses of the sort that I aim to reject in the present Article.
4 The temptation to draw the legal analysis from work in moral and political philosophy is
particularly great, given the power and depth of work such as that of Rawls and Scanlon on
reasonableness. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
5 See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
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economically oriented approach, on the one hand, or in a deontic manner,
on the other. Terry started with the idea that being negligent was a matter
of deviating from a reasonable person standard, and then essentially analyzed being a reasonable person as a matter of not taking unreasonable risks.
Once one moves on to the question of which risks are unreasonable, one is
essentially making a judgment about which risks should be taken and which
should not be taken: “unreasonable” is a vessel into which such a judgment
can be poured. American negligence law—which gives the question of
breach in a negligence case to the jury—can be understood as delegating the
normative decision about which risks are justifiable to the jury. Common
law negligence doctrine in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
former Commonwealth countries, contains much guidance on how best to
think about this normative question. Instrumentalists and utilitarians tend
to offer one sort of interpretation of this body of doctrine, 6 while
rights-based theorists tend to offer a rather different account.7
I belong to a handful of tort scholars who believe that the terms of the
debate are themselves unacceptable, 8 because the breach or negligence
standard of the negligence tort is not really about ascertaining a reasonable
level of risk. On this view, the Hand formula grossly misrepresents what
“negligence” really is. Indeed, Henry Terry and the Restatements of Torts
(the most recent of which analyzes breach through the foreseeability of
harm, magnitude of harm, and burden of precautions)9 were all making a
big mistake at an analytical level that leads to a variety of different distortions in tort doctrine and tort theory.
In the majority of cases, an actor is negligent when he or she fails to use
ordinary care, and ordinary care is that which a reasonably prudent person,
or a reasonably careful person, would take under like circumstances. The
concept of “ordinary care” carries content that is not dependent on the
6 See generally Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (setting
forth an economic interpretation of the Hand Formula).
7 See generally Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996) (setting forth a rights-based interpretation of reasonableness and the
Hand Formula).
8 See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 591 (2002) (surveying jury
instructions on “negligence” in all 50 states); Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety
Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315, 343-44 (1990) (challenging the
idea that “the unreasonable foreseeable risk test is really the standard of conduct applied in
negligence cases”); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4
THEORETICAL I NQUIRIES L. 145, 162-80 (2003) (explaining how Hand did not apply his
“aggregate-risk-utility formula” in many cases in which he said he did).
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (2010).
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notion of “reasonableness,” understood as an objectively justifiable risk
level. The level of risk is not the key question. The phrases “reasonable
person” and “unreasonable risk” are not best analyzed as shells into which
risk–benefit analyses should be poured. I began spelling out this view in the
article Sleight of Hand,10 published several years ago and briefly summarized
in Part V, infra. This article is an indirect continuation of that project.
Negligence law is so deeply associated with reasonableness that a critique
like my own requires that I delve more deeply into reasonableness
throughout the law, before returning to examine negligence law.
Parts I, II, and III explore, respectively, syntactical, semantic, and conceptual aspects of reasonableness cognates throughout various parts of the
law. Part IV turns to torts, setting forth a leading position on reasonableness in tort law—roughly speaking, a Hand Formula view as understood in
Posnerian terms. Part V provides a concise critique of the Hand Formula
account and tentatively puts forth a competing account, called the “moderation-based account of reasonableness.” In Parts VI, VII, and VIII, I develop,
dialectically, a critique of the moderation-based account, a renewed version
of the Hand Formula account, and a “modernation-and-mutuality”
conception of reasonableness. The article concludes in Part IX by reflecting
on the place of reasonableness within the debate between realism and
doctrinalism that forms the core of this Symposium.
I. VARIANTS IN THE LANGUAGE OF REASONABLENESS
The range of uses of “reasonableness” in law is so great that a list is not
an efficient way to describe and demarcate it. The modes of employing
“reasonable” and its cognates differ in many respects, which combine in
innumerable ways. This Part thus begins simply by considering the various
cognates of “reasonable” that appear in different parts of the law, and some
dimensions of difference in their meanings. Part II begins to distinguish
between different families of reasonableness uses in the law.11

10
11

See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999 (2007).
While I am not among those who believe that dictionary definitions are normally entitled
to any special salience in legal analysis, I note that Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary definition
of “reasonable” provides a set of alternatives that is consistent with what is provided in this essay.
1a: being in accordance with reason <a reasonable theory>
b: not extreme or excessive <reasonable requests>
c: moderate, fair <a reasonable chance> <a reasonable price>
d: inexpensive
2a: having the faculty of reason
b: possessing sound judgment <a reasonable man>
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A. Reasonable and Unreasonable
The most obvious cognate of the “reasonable” in the law is the “unreasonable.” While negligence law and basic criminal law typically refer
affirmatively to the “reasonably prudent person,” the “reasonable person,”
“reasonable care,” or the “reasonable consumer,” Fourth Amendment law
and antitrust law do the opposite. The Fourth Amendment’s text does not
require that searches and seizures be “reasonable,” but instead forbids
“unreasonable” searches and seizures. 12 Similarly, as the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act, it prohibits “unreasonable” restraints on trade.13 Cognates of both “reasonable” and “unreasonable”
can be found throughout the law.
It might seem obvious that unreasonableness is simply the opposite of
reasonableness, and that it makes no difference whether a legal standard is
expressed in terms of a requirement of reasonable conduct or a requirement
to refrain from unreasonable conduct. It is by no means clear whether this is
true. Forbidding of the unreasonable may, despite its negativity, be more
permissive than requiring the reasonable. Rather than selecting conduct that
satisfies some standard and requiring that all adhere to that standard, an
unreasonableness standard seems to permit everything except that which is
unreasonable. The domain of possible restraints on trade that transactors
agree to is vast, and most are permitted; it is only the “unreasonable
restraints on trade” that are prohibited.
B. Optimizing or Range-Delineating
I suspect that the distinction between the reasonable and the unreasonable is not actually very accurate in tracking a difference between less and
more permissive standards, but this discussion does alert us to what may be
an important ambiguity within the term “reasonable” itself. Perhaps the
requirement of a “reasonable rate,” a “reasonably prudent person,” a “reasonable factfinder,” or a “reasonable expectation of privacy” can be used in a

Reasonable definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/reasonable (last visited Feb. 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9YV64L97.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
13 See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (citations
omitted)(“[T]he Court has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable
restraints.’”); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (holding that “the
standard of reason” applies to anti-competitive restraints of trade under the Sherman Act).
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pointed, optimizing way14 (as, for example, Posner’s analysis of the standard
of care in negligence law suggests15). Even if this is so, it certainly can be
used in a broader manner that denotes a range of possibilities, the members
of which remain permissible so long as they do not extend beyond some
outer demarcation into the domain of the unreasonable.16
Among the most prominent of the range-delimiting usages of “reasonable” are financial ones: statutes, regulations, case law, and contracts frequently refer to “reasonable rates” or “reasonable prices.” 17 Here,
“excessive” is a comfortable antonym for “reasonable.”18 Relatedly, it is
worth noting that sometimes a definite article is used preceding a “reasonable” cognate, as in “the reasonable person” standard, while sometimes it is an
indefinite article, as in “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
C. Adjectival Versus Adverbial Modification
As significant as the positive–negative difference is the distinction between the adjectival use of “reasonable” (or “unreasonable”) to modify a
noun and the adverbial use of “reasonably” to modify an adjective (or a
verb). The uses of “reasonable” in the phrases “reasonable expectation of
privacy” and “reasonable factfinder,” while quite different from one another,
are entirely different from the use of “reasonably” in the phrases “reasonably necessary,” 19 “reasonably feasible,” 20 “reasonably fair,” 21 “reasonably
clear,”22 and “reasonably detailed.”23 In the latter contexts, “reasonably” is
14 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012) (noting that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission shall set “the just and reasonable rate” (emphasis added)).
15 See Posner, supra note 6.
16 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621(18)(B) (2012) (noting that each state shall consider authorizing
qualified utility companies to create investment programs including “a reasonable rate” of return
(emphasis added)).
17 E.g., Id.
18 See infra Part II.A. (discussing further “excessive” as an antonym for “reasonable”).
19 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2012) (defining “disposable income,” in part, by reference
to the amount “reasonably necessary” to be expended for maintenance and support of dependents).
20 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 3106(b) (2012) (requiring development of a vocational plan for veterans where attainment of a vocational goal is “reasonably feasible”).
21 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-20, 108(5) (2014) (empowering the creation of a public
utility conditioned, in part, on whether the seller will receive a “reasonably fair” value for its
capital investment).
22 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L AWS ch. 176D, § 3(9)(f) (2014) (including, among unfair or deceptive acts or practices of insurance companies, failure “to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear”).
23 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. L AWS § 17-8-10(b)(3) (2010) (noting that where bond proposals are to
be placed on local ballots, there must be advance notice for voters including “reasonably detailed”
descriptions of the proposal).
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used not to designate an attribute of a person, expectation, action, or policy,
but to qualify in degree the attribute specified. In federal bankruptcy law,
for example, many provisions require the use of the concept of monthly
“disposable income,” which in turn needs to be defined. Rather than
defining disposable income by subtracting expenditures that are “necessary,”
the bankruptcy code subtracts expenditures that are “reasonably necessary.”24 Rather than requiring of administrative agencies measures that are
“feasible,” the law sometimes requires measures that are “reasonably
feasible.”25 How clear must a contractual provision be in order to bind an
obligor to some kind of waiver? In some cases, the contractual provision
must be “clear and convincing” or “clear and incontrovertible,” while in
other cases, it must be “reasonably clear.”26
Among adverbial uses of “reasonably,” some (like those indicated above)
modify adjectives, while others modify verbs. Thus, in fraud cases, a court
asks whether the plaintiff “reasonably relied” upon the defendant’s misrepresentation,27 and in nuisance cases, whether the defendant unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property.28
II. FAMILIES OF “REASONABLENESS” USE
A. The Antonym of “Excessive”
Many usages of “reasonable” in the law invoke a notion that is familiar
to the marketplace: twelve dollars is a reasonable price for a large pizza, but
it is not a reasonable price for a loaf of bread. Frequently in the law,
reasonableness is utilized to qualify prices, rates, and costs. It is often used
to qualify “time,” as in “within a reasonable time.”29 In all of these cases,
“reasonable” is roughly the opposite of “excessive.”
The “unreasonable restraint of trade” of antitrust law and the “unreasonable interference” of nuisance law are all examples of unreasonableness
as excessiveness: excessive restraints of trade and excessive interferences
24
25
26
27

See § 1325(b)(2), supra note 19.
See § 3106(b), supra note 20.
See § 3(9)(f), supra note 22.
See, e.g., Raysoni v. Payless Auto Deals, LLC, 766 S.E.2d 24, 25 (Ga. 2014) (noting that
fraud includes a reasonable reliance requirement).
28 See, e.g., Grundy v. Thurston Cnty., 117 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (noting
that nuisance contains a requirement that the defendant unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property).
29 See, e.g., Mayfield v. Koroghli, 184 P.3d 362, 366 (Nev. 2008) (noting that absent a provision specifying that time is of the essence, contracts must be performed within a “reasonable
time”).
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with the use and enjoyment of property are both violations of the prohibitions of these respective legal norms. Indeed, it is part of the force of these
norms that they do not rule out all restraints of trade or all interferences
with land use and enjoyment—only excessive ones.
It is worth recognizing that even within the few examples just given,
there may be significant variation in force, tone, and nuance. “Reasonable”
is a very common and well-worn adjective for referring to a moderate, or
buyer-favorable price, and “reasonable” is comfortably and commonly used
as a qualifier of time vaguely connoting a kind of Goldilocks “just right”
quality. In both of these examples, the excessiveness connoted by “unreasonable” and the moderation connoted by “reasonable” implicitly call to
mind a sort of scalar evaluation—dollars or days, or some other scaled unit.
No such scalar conception of excessiveness is easily available in the antitrust
or nuisance examples. It would be a distortion of judicial thinking to ignore
the many different aspects of excessiveness that could, for example, make a
neighbor’s business an unreasonable (or excessive) interference with the use
and enjoyment of property.
B. Passable Exercises of Judgment or Interpretative Capacity (and Deference)
Civil litigators and civil procedure scholars every day confront the question of when a litigant’s case should even go to trial, or if at trial, should be
sent to the jury, or if appealed, should be upheld. Judges confront the
question of whether to permit a jury to hear evidence, to permit a jury to
deliberate, or to permit a jury verdict to stand. The answer, overwhelmingly, is that the jury should get to decide, but only if a reasonable juror could
find in favor of the plaintiff.30 Conversely, a judge is not bound to defer to a
jury’s decision if the court decides that no reasonable juror could (or could
have) found as the jury did. The boundary between what a reasonable juror
could have found and what a reasonable juror could not have found is the
boundary the judge must be willing to cross if he or she wishes to supplant
the jury’s judgment. Regardless of whether the judge agrees or disagrees
with the jury finding, he or she is not permitted to find the other way, but is
required to accept it unless he or she determines that the jury’s determination was not one that a reasonable jury could have found. Here, a “reasonable” finding is one that is within the domain of judgments that could be reached
without something having gone wrong in the factfinding process, and it should be
30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (describing the standard for when a court may grant judgment as a matter of law in terms of whether “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”).
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capable of being applied independently of whether, in the end, the person
calling it “reasonable” accepts the finding (or happens to exercise her
judgment in a way that is likewise reasonable, but diverges in outcome).
The use of “reasonable” in Chevron deference cases works similarly.31
Courts will not accept an agency interpretation that diverges from what the
text plainly demands, but after that it is largely up to the agency to decide
how to interpret the statute—largely, but not entirely. Chevron requires that
a court accept the agency’s interpretation (at this stage) so long as it is
reasonable.32 The Chevron holding means that where the interpretation is
one that could only have been the product of something going awry in the
legal interpretive reasoning, a court is not required to accept it. As in the
case of judgments as a matter of law in civil procedure, “reasonableness”
marks a boundary of deference to the judgments of others within the legal
system. A court determining whether to displace the judgment of another
actor in the system is being told that when the other actor has essentially
made a judgment among options, each of which could have been arrived at
by a passable exercise of reasoned judgment and without skewing by passion
or prejudice, it is not proper to displace the judgment. Otherwise, however,
it is proper. While reasonableness in this context serves the function of
circumscribing deference, it does so by utilizing a notion of what is a
rationally defensible exercise of factfinding judgment, interpretive judgment, and so on. In this sense, reasonableness is de facto playing a role of
power allocation, and at least purporting to do so by reference to whether a
capacity for a certain kind of judgment has been exercised passably well. A
determination of whether the power allocation is the horse pulling the cart
of the epistemic evaluation, or vice versa, would require greater analysis of
the domains within which courts utilize such standards.
C. Reasonableness and Justifiability (Epistemic)
In certain parts of the criminal law of some jurisdictions and in certain
constitutional torts, whether a defendant’s breach of a legal rule is actionable will turn on whether it would have been reasonable to believe, under
those circumstances, that the legal rule was not being breached. 33 An
important subset of these are “reasonable mistake of fact” cases. The Model
31
32

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
Id. at 844 (noting that where Congress has implicitly delegated to an agency the authority
to “elucidate a specific provision of [a] statute by regulation,” “a court may not substitute its own
construction . . . for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”).
33 See, e.g., TEX. P ENAL CODE A NN. § 8.02(a) (West 2013) (noting that reasonableness of
mistake is a component of a criminal defense).
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Penal Code and the Supreme Court of California (in People v. Hernandez34),
for example, famously declared that a defendant’s reasonable belief that his
sexual partner was over the age of consent could exculpate him from charges
of statutory rape.35 Certain cases of self-defense involve a defendant who
mistakenly believed he was being attacked with deadly force. In those cases,
the reasonableness of the mistaken belief is essential to whether the defense
truly exculpates, or merely mitigates, the defendant’s use of deadly force.36
“Reasonableness” of belief here has nothing whatsoever to do with
deference, but it is epistemic and it does pertain to proper exercises of
judgment. This utilization of reasonableness actually presupposes that there
is a true answer to the question (e.g., whether the woman eighteen years of
age yet), and the defendant missed it. Nonetheless, whether it was or was
not due to a faulty exercise of judgment is an important question. Although
there was, in an important sense, a legal wrong committed, certain jurisdictions have decided, in these circumstances, not to hold the defendant
responsible for having committed it if he or she had the good faith belief
and his having the belief was not attributable to a faulty exercise of judgment. Remarkably, the United States Supreme Court expanded its form of
qualified immunity in § 1983 claims to be significantly broader than this.37
The torts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation include a qualified
reliance requirement sometimes labeled a “reasonable reliance” requirement
and sometimes labeled a “justifiable reliance” requirement. As this pairing
indicates, reasonableness in this context is much the same as justifiability.38
Where the reliance stems from a poor, defective, or ungrounded decision to
rely on another’s statement, the putatively injured party is not entitled to
redress the putative injury. It is not quite right to pin the harm done on the
party inducing the reliance, where the party who was in fact deceived was
unwarranted in having relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation.
Reasonableness is used to pick out epistemic defensibility, as in the case of
reasonable mistake.

34
35

393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
Id. at 677; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes
1985) (noting that apart from statutory rape cases involving children below the age of 10—in
which reasonable belief does not exculpate—the accused can rebut a statutory rape charge by
proving reasonableness of his belief that the child’s age was above the statutory minimum).
36 See, e.g., State v. Joseph, 803 A.2d 1074, 1108 (N.J. 2002) (noting that self-defense requires
a reasonable belief in the necessity of force).
37 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982) (expanding qualified immunity).
38 See, e.g., Lucky 7, L.L.C. v. THT Realty, L.L.C., 775 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Neb. 2009) (treating “justifiable reliance” and “reasonable reliance” as interchangeable).
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D. Two Kinds of Practical Reasonableness
Two families of reasonableness usage in the law resemble the epistemic
deployments set forth in the previous section because they both involve
justifiability, but they differ because they do not pertain in the first instance
to the deliverances of the senses or the deliverances of speculative reason.
One sort of usage of reasonableness involves the reasonableness of
instrumental rationality. To some degree, the Supreme Court’s requirement
that a statute must be reasonably related to its end in order to pass rational
basis review is a requirement of instrumental rationality. If a statute is
putatively aimed at achieving a certain end, but it is poorly designed to
reach that end (being underinclusive, overinclusive, or otherwise ill-fitting)
it is likely to fail the test of being “reasonably related.”
A different but equally important practical conception of reasonableness
pertains to the use of practical reason and practical judgment in settings of
mutuality or interdependency. A nuisance, for example, is an unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of property. Courts sometimes
further define such interferences as ones that exceed what a reasonable
person can be expected to tolerate.39 An example of practical reasonableness
that is quite distinct from economic rationality (and requires taking other
persons’ needs and expectations seriously) is found in the law of contracts,
leases, and licenses: documents frequently require a landowner’s consent
prior to an assignment, sublease, or sublicense, but prohibit the person
enjoying this right from “unreasonably” withholding consent.40 Insurance
companies are frequently deemed to owe a duty of reasonable settlement.41
Philosophers might notice that the reasonableness involved in these
settings has the flavor of John Rawls’s use of the concept of reasonableness
in Political Liberalism 42 and other works, and also to some of Thomas
Scanlon’s use of reasonableness in the articulation of his contractualist
views.43 For each, the unreasonable person is one with an inadequate sense
of mutuality or reciprocity; he is like a spring break buddy who insists on
Chinese food for the fourth night in a row because he likes it so much better
than the pizza, salads, or sushi preferred by his travel mates. Being reasona39 See, e.g., Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conf. Ass’n, 26 A.3d 931, 939 (Md. 2011) (approving a
jury instruction that recognized that landowners must be willing to endure a certain amount of
inconvenience and discomfort).
40 See, e.g., 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., 485 A.2d 199 (D.C. 1984) (noting
that a “reasonable refusal” clause does not permit pure economic motives).
41 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Md. Cas. Co., 41 P.3d 128, 132 (Cal. 2002) (noting a duty to accept
reasonable settlement).
42 See RAWLS, Political Liberalism, supra note 4.
43 See SCANLON, supra note 4.
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ble in this sense involves recognizing that others have similarly placed
demands, and that we are all in this together. Tort and property law’s
commitment to the idea that there are unreasonable interferences with the
use and enjoyment of property requires believing that there are some
interferences that it is reasonable for us to be expected to put up with, and
others that go beyond this level. Reasonableness requires a sense of fitting
one’s demands alongside the multiple demands of others, which one accommodates to a certain extent.
Practical reason in the sense of instrumental rationality, speculative
reason in the purely epistemic sense, and reasonableness in the mutuality
sense referred to above, are all quite comfortably linked to a notion of
justifiability and, in this sense, to the concept of reasons and the language of
reasons. The philosophical viability of each of these, and the relationships
among them, or lack thereof—indeed, even the question of whether they are
one or two or three different concepts—are of course topics that have
generated tomes of philosophical work at the highest (and lowest) levels.
The point here is not to take a position, but merely to observe that there are
at least quite prominent superficial differences among these reasonableness
concepts as used by the law, even though all of them connect in important
ways with the language of justification and reasons.
E. Secondary Qualities in the Law
In a number of settings, legal rules are made to turn on properties that
are quite difficult to define because they seem to depend in some way on
subjective responses of thought or emotion. The public disclosure of private
facts tort is a good example. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a
“private fact,” in part, by looking at the sort of personal fact (unlike one’s
hair color, for example) that would be embarrassing to have publicly
disseminated (like suffering from an STD, for example).44 It is difficult to
say who would be highly offended by the disclosure of such a fact about
herself or himself—need it be everyone, most people, some people, or just
the plaintiff? The Restatement articulates the standard by saying that a
private fact is that which a reasonable person would find embarrassing to have
disclosed.45

44
45

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
Id.
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I have elsewhere used the term “secondary legal qualities” to refer to the
privacy of private facts and similar attributes or qualities.46 The idea is that
just as colors are defined in reference to the perceptual responses of normal
persons, so too are certain legal qualities defined in reference to the affective responses of normal persons. For these kinds of qualities, the word
“reasonable” is typically used in defining moments. In an earlier article,47 I
argued that the justification of self-defense implicitly draws upon the idea
that threatening conduct under certain circumstances creates a privilege of
self-defense; our legal system utilizes the idea of conduct that a reasonable
person would regard as presenting an imminent threat of bodily harm in
order to delineate the privilege of self-defense so conceived. The tort of
battery involves intentionally causing a touching that is harmful or offensive. “Offensive” is defined in terms of what would lead a reasonable person
to be offended.48
Secondary legal qualities present yet a different role for reasonableness,
which some usages involve and some do not. Of course, this notion is partly
epistemic, and in other ways can be characterized in terms of many of the
categories laid out above. But the key phenomenon here is that legal rules
govern by setting forth a certain standard for those who are expected to
apply the rules, but the standard contemplates that those following the rule
will have the capacity to recognize the qualities through which the rule
categorizes. Of course, at some level, the law is privileging those who
respond to a set of circumstances in a way that the judge or jury would later
find “normal,” as against those who have the same response but under
circumstances the decisionmaker does not regard as normal; in this respect,
the law entrenches conventional responses. The word “reasonable” might
appear to be a self-congratulatory emblem of such conventionalism. This
picture misses something of significance, however. The legal system’s
expectations of (potential) defendants are circumscribed in an important
way; the acts for which one will be held accountable—or, in the case of selfdefense, for which one might face aggressive action deemed rightful—do
not turn on the reactions they in fact generate, but on whether they possess
qualities that are generally understood to precipitate such reactions in
people with normal sensibilities and reactions.
46 See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1625 (2002) (applying the concept of secondary qualities to illuminate the tort of emotional
harm); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 579 (1996) (introducing the concept of “secondary legal quality” by reference to the
threateningness of a putative assailant’s conduct).
47 Zipursky, supra note 46, at 603.
48 Id. at 600.

2015]

Reasonableness

2145

Products liability law offers a famous example in modern tort law of a
secondary legal quality that has caused some serious trouble in the courts
and the legal academy. The attribute of “defectiveness” in the “consumer
expectation test” for design defect—as design defect was initially
understood—is probably best analyzed as a secondary legal quality. Under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment (g), a product is
defective if it is “unreasonably dangerous” to the consumer, and under
comment (i), whether a product is “unreasonably dangerous” turns on
whether it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer.”49 Jurors are invited to speculate, after an
accident, whether the product as it actually performed would strike the
ordinary consumer as surprisingly dangerous. Although the word “ordinary”
was used in comment (g) to modify “consumer,” here, it is just the kind of
context in which “reasonable” is often used. Some jurisdictions do, in fact,
spell out the consumer expectation test by using the term “reasonable”
rather than “ordinary” to qualify “consumer.”50
The products liability example suggests an even larger role for “reasonableness” as a secondary quality in the law, for it is (or is very close to being)
an example of contract interpretation. Whether a person has accepted an
offer in contract law does not turn on what was in the promisor’s mind, but
rather on whether his or her actual conduct, under the circumstances, would
have been understood by a reasonable person as an expression of consent.51
Put differently, whether a course of conduct by an alleged obligee actually
had the attribute of being an acceptance turns on how a reasonable person
would interpret the conduct. This is but another example that goes along
with the idea that meaning in contract law is to be understood objectively,
but what objectively means is in accordance with how a reasonable person under
the circumstances would have understood the language and conduct of the other
party.
F. Mixed and Other Categories
The categories laid out above are not put forward as jointly exhaustive
or as mutually exclusive. The Americans with Disabilities Act’s “reasonable
accommodations” requirement might (or might not) fall outside of all of the
categories listed above, for example. Conversely, the “beyond a reasonable
49
50

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 402A, cmt. (g).
See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (describing a version
of this type of consumer expectations test).
51 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 27 (7th ed. 2014) (describing the objective theory
of assent).
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doubt” standard of criminal law might fall into several categories simultaneously. My point is that there are a variety of different meanings of
“reasonableness” cognates in the law, and the identification of families of
reasonableness uses does not purport to be exhaustive and does not purport
to capture every use without remainder.
III. JURISPRUDENTIAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Standards and Vagueness
A number of different attributes of “reasonableness” cognates in the law
cut across several different areas and are therefore worth mentioning
separately. First, both the adjectival and the adverbial uses of “reasonableness” cognates are frequently used in a manner that flags the standard-like
quality of the relevant legal norm. This is patently true when the Supreme
Court holds that reasonable constraints of trade will be permissible. In
order to condemn a constraint of trade as impermissible and illegal, one
needs to decide first that it is unreasonable. In other words, the Sherman
Act’s legal norms, as they have been interpreted, are better understood as
standards, rather than rules. The Supreme Court entrenched that determination in its early Sherman Act decisions, holding that only unreasonable
restraints of trade are violations.52 The same is arguably true of the requirement in nuisance law that an interference be an “unreasonable interference” if it is to generate a right of action.53 This principle is also reflected
in Fourth Amendment law’s rule that not all searches and seizures are
constitutionally prohibited, only unreasonable searches or seizures (or
warrantless searches and seizures).54
Notably, the adjective “reasonable” and the adverb “reasonably” can be
utilized simply to convert what would otherwise operate as a rule into
something operating as a standard. As indicated above, “reasonably feasible”
replaces “feasible,” “reasonably related” replaces “related,” and so on. Not
only do these qualifiers ensure that it is a moderate level of the quality
being designated, they also ensure that the one applying the law (be it legal
actor or judge) is being guided in a manner that requires the exercise of
judgment, not simply the identification of a clear-cut attribute. Of course,
52 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1911) (explaining role of
judgment—rule of reason—in adjudicating antitrust violations).
53 See, e.g., Grundy v. Thurston Cnty., 117 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (noting
that nuisance contains a requirement that the defendant unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property).
54 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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in some cases, the term being modified is itself standard-like, as in the case
of “reasonably related,” but there is no reason to suppose that such is the
case across the board.
It is worth noting that whether a legal term or phrase renders the legal
provision in which it occurs a standard rather than a rule is not necessarily
the same question as whether the legal term or phrase is vague. “No
overweight persons are permitted on the rollercoaster under any circumstances” is probably best categorized as a rule, not a standard, but the phrase
“overweight persons” is like the adjective “tall,” a prototypical example of a
vague term. Leaving aside the question of a whether legal provisions
consisting only of non-vague predicates could sometimes qualify as standards, we can say, at a minimum, that the vagueness of key predicates does
not necessarily capture all of what renders a legal provision standard-like
rather than rule-like. A term is relatively vague when a substantial set of
cases exist in which there is not convergence among linguistically competent and well-informed speakers as to whether or not the term is properly
applied as to the case. There is not a correct answer, from the point of view
of a competent English speaker, as to whether a man who is 5’11’’ counts as
“tall,” and to this extent “tall” is vague.55 A legal provision operates as a
standard rather than a rule when the capacity to apply the provision turns
on the ability to utilize a relatively broader set of capacities for judgment,
typically including purposive reasoning.
B. Two Kinds of Delegation of Judgment Power
Second, many legal norms that include reasonableness cognates are, in
effect, left to appellate courts to flesh out the content of the law. In this
sense, the use of reasonableness language sometimes results in a de facto
delegation of lawmaking power to the appellate courts. The United States
Supreme Court’s body of decisional law on the Fourth Amendment’s
“unreasonable search and seizure” provision is perhaps the most illustrious
example of this phenomenon. The Court’s seizing upon its own language of
“unreasonable restraint of trade” in interpreting the Sherman Act is a
similar example. In each case, a more sophisticated institutional analysis
would ask whether there is interpretive lawmaking by government actors
outside the judiciary (e.g., police departments and state or federal legislatures, in the Fourth Amendment case, or the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission, in the Sherman Act example).
55 See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 31-33 (2000) (describing vagueness as a source of indeterminacy).
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Notwithstanding the commonness of “reasonableness” predicates serving as instruments for de facto delegation of law construction power, not all
reasonableness predicates—indeed, not all reasonableness predicates that
allocate power—work in this way. Courts applying considerations of juror
reasonableness in matter-of-law rulings are not using the vagueness of
reasonableness to construct new law (as a general matter). Indeed, in
Chevron cases, reasonableness analysis is a device for refraining from making
or constructing law, for deferring (or not deferring) to other decisionmakers.56
Even when “reasonableness” determinations are not to be used for
deferring, but rather to guide a decisionmaker into a certain kind of substantive judgment, the judgment is not necessarily law creation. A court is
not necessarily making law when it decides, in a particular contract case
before it, what would qualify as a reasonable time of acceptance. And, in
any of the examples of secondary legal qualities, reasonableness in the law is
a guide for factfinders, not lawmakers. In one sense, the power to determine
the content of a legal standard is being delegated, but it is not a delegation
of lawmaking power but a delegation of judgment (typically normative or
partially normative) to factfinders in a particular case. To be sure, courts
often make judgments as a matter of law under the rubric of the reasonable
person, but that is a different matter.57
C. The Reasonable Person as a Decision-Guiding Device
Third, the famous figure of “the reasonable person” is found in many
parts of the law that utilize “reasonableness” or its cognates, but not all of

56
57

See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 838 (1986)
Cf. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1230 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (holding
that dissemination of information about the plaintiff’s misconduct, drinking, and adultery did not
generate liability under public disclosure of private fact tort, and expressly discussing “what would
offend the sensibilities of a reasonable person”). To say this is, in a sense, to construct law via the
use of the term “reasonable.” What is going on here, however, is that the common law of privacy
has, in the first instance, empowered factfinders to decide whether something was a private fact
and directed them to use the concept of a reasonable person in answering what is essentially a
mixed question of law and fact within the circumstances of each particular case. In utilizing their
power to override or preempt certain findings in this domain by ruling as a matter of law, courts
can, in effect, make law. But that is very different from a federal court utilizing the “reasonableness” cognates as it articulates judge-made rules determining which kinds of business practices
constitute antitrust violations and which do not. It is different not just procedurally but also
substantively. In the Sherman Act context, the concept of unreasonableness serves only to capture,
conclusorily, an after-the-fact lawmaking decision made on independent grounds, while in the
privacy context, the court is actually saying something about what a factfinder should be able to
find reasonable or appropriate for a person to consider embarrassing.
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them. Rational basis scrutiny in constitutional analysis considers whether a
statute is “reasonably related” to its ends, but the reasonable person (or
even the reasonable legislature) is not really a part of this. Similar for
antitrust law’s reasonable restraints, utility statutes’ reasonable rates,
personal jurisdiction considerations, and so on for a wide range of cases that
fall in the non-excessiveness and circumscribing-deference categories above.
“The reasonable person” is most commonly utilized as a
decision-guiding device for judges and jurors, one that often allows them
more comfortably to make reasonableness determinations where necessary.
In ascertaining whether, for example, “a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for” a nonmoving party on some
issue, a judge would typically think about whether a reasonable person
hearing that evidence could find for the plaintiff. 58 When ascertaining
whether a piano teacher’s strumming his fingers briefly on his student’s
shoulders during a lesson was offensive, the court was required to determine
whether a reasonable person under those circumstances would have been
offended; when a criminal defendant who preemptively stabbed a person
whom he wrongfully believed was attacking him, we ask whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would or could have believed that.59 In
none of these cases, however, are we ultimately worried about the standard
of conduct for this hypothetical law-abiding person. In all, we are ultimately
concerned with what lies inside and what lies outside of the boundaries of
the concept that circumscribes liability.
D. The Normative Versus Descriptive Confusion
Finally, there has been substantial writing on the question of whether
reasonableness standards are normative or descriptive.60 In a nutshell, the
issue revolves around the analysis of statements like, “A reasonable person
would not X under circumstances C,” when used in reasoning that someone
who X’d under circumstances C had violated a legal norm requiring reasonableness. One view is that the statement means, “one should not X in
circumstances C,” and the transitional premise would be, “being reasonable
requires not X’ing in circumstances C” or, “reason requires not X’ing in
circumstances C.” That is, of course, the normative interpretation. Another
view is that the statement means, “The modal behavior in the relevant legal
58
59
60

FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323
(2012) (exploring whether “reasonable person” standard is best defined in normative or positive
terms, and arguing that defining “reasonable person” normatively is the superior choice).
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community is not X’ing in circumstances C,” and the transitional premises
would be, “average persons in the relevant legal community do not X under
circumstances C.” This is the so-called “descriptive” interpretation.
The discussion in prior Parts of this Article demonstrate that neither the
normative nor the descriptive interpretation, as stated, captures how
reasonableness operates in the law in the vast majority of cases that invoke a
“reasonable person” standard. The question is not simply what ought to be
done or what ought to be believed. Nor is the question one of head counting
in a straightforward empirical way, as the putative descriptivist imagines.
The thought experiment—say, in a privacy case, “what would a reasonable
person feel about his mental illness being publicly revealed; would he be
embarrassed?”—involves a kind of judgment that is both normative and
descriptive. For one thing, what counts as a reasonable person is itself a
question with significant normative content. It is a bit like asking what a
person with good moral character would say, in that there is no
non-normative answer to the question of who would count as a reasonable
person just as there is no non-normative answer to the question of who
would count as having good moral character. Nonetheless, it would also be a
mistake to suppose that the question is equivalent to the question about
what ought to be done or how one ought to behave. Let us assume for the
purposes of argument that a reasonable person would save his own children
before others in case of mass drowning. One may simultaneously concede
the normativity of “reasonable person” and the truth of that statement
without committing oneself to a view on what ought to be done in such a
scenario.
IV. REASONABLENESS IN NEGLIGENCE LAW: THE POSNERIAN
ACCOUNT
The comments above do not, of course, present any thorough analysis of
the place of “reasonable” and its cognates in the law, but they should suffice
to undercut any presumption that reasonableness in the law is essentially
epistemic, economic, or rationalistic. Perhaps more importantly, they
should also undercut the claim that “reasonable” and its cognates are
essentially delegative, makeweight, or meaningless. Our new point of
departure ought to be this: the word “reasonable” and its cognates play a
variety of different roles in the law, and one must understand something
about the way the law in question works in order to grasp how “reasonable”
cognates are used within it.
With this in mind, I turn to an area of law I do know something about—
tort law in general and negligence law in particular. This Part presents a
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Posnerian account of the breach standard in negligence law, followed by a
critique of that account based on the positive law of negligence in all fifty
states. It then reformulates that critique in terms of the analysis of reasonableness in negligence law. Parts V and VI are dialectical. While Part V
presents three different sorts of challenges to my own account, each based
on a different aspect of reasonableness, Part VI modifies my earlier account
to meet these challenges. Recognizing a suitable conception of reasonableness for negligence law remains critical to understanding how negligence
law works.
Richard Posner’s classic interpretation of the negligence standard as an
economic version of the Hand Formula is plainly the most illustrious extant
theory of the meaning of “negligence.”61 For many scholars, one of its most
attractive features is that negligence law is supposedly based on a standard
of “reasonable care.” When reasonable care is understood to require rational
conduct, and when rationality is understood as economic rationality from a
point of view that aggregates social wealth, then reasonable care requires
taking precautions if and only if those precautions are cost-justified. And, lo
and behold, the classic Hand Formula of negligence law actually defines
“reasonable care” as the taking of precautions if and only if the cost of the
precaution is justified by the magnitude of risk it diminishes.62 The marriage between the economists’ cost–benefit analysis as a metric for the
standard of right conduct and the “breach standard” of negligence law is
made when “reasonable care” is interpreted as care that it is cost-justified
from the point of view of socially aggregative economic rationality.63
There is a second way to get to a Posnerian account. The early twentieth
century tort scholar Henry Terry published a prominent article on negligence in the Harvard Law Review expressly stating that negligence is
behavior “involv[ing] an unreasonably great risk.”64 Terry’s work, moreover,
has been embraced by the First, Second, and Third Restatements of Torts.
Hand’s innovation (made between the First and Second Restatements) was
to make Terry’s idea algebraic and utilitarian, and Posner’s was to turn the
soft utilitarian conception in Hand’s formula into one that appeared
rigorous and openly wealth-based rather than welfare-based. But the first,
and in some ways the most basic, change laid in Terry’s characterization of

61
62
63

See generally Posner, supra note 6.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
See Keating, supra note 7, at 333 n.25 (depicting Posner’s interpretation of the Hand Formula as rooted in economic rationality).
64 Terry, supra note 5, at 40.
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negligence as the generation of unreasonable risk,65 rather than negligence as
the failure to act as a reasonably prudent person would act. Terry’s famed
Negligence article set out a model of what factors go into making a risk
reasonable or unreasonable: (i) the magnitude of the risk; (ii) the importance or value of the thing risked; (iii) the value of the collateral object
for which the dangerous activity is undertaken; (iv) the likelihood that
taking the risk will produce the collateral object; and (v) the likelihood that
not taking the risk will preclude obtaining the collateral object.66
Let us ask a fundamental question here. In what sense do these factors
bear on whether a risk is reasonable or unreasonable? This question leads, in
turn, to a more basic one: how can a risk have the attribute of
reasonableness or unreasonableness? As to the latter question, I think that
there appear to be three plausible answers, based on our exploration thus
far. One is that, when we speak of a reasonable or unreasonable risk, we are
referring, in an abbreviated manner, to a risk that a reasonable person would
(or would not) take. A second idea is that the word “unreasonable” in this
context means excessive and the word “reasonable” connotes the opposite of
excessive. A third is that “reasonable” means justifiable or justified, while
“unreasonable” means unjustifiable or unjustified. Whether these three are,
could be, or should be independent from one another is yet a further
question, to which I will turn at various junctures.
Terry’s own approach strongly suggests that, whether or not he eventually meant to connote the first and second senses of “reasonable,” he aimed
above all to make progress on the third. His analysis suggests that the
reasonableness of a risk depends on what is being risked and its value, the
reason it is being risked, at what costs and with what prospects. In Hand’s,
Posner’s, and the Restatement versions, we are greatly concerned with how
burdensome the elimination or reduction of the risk would be. In any
version, the focus of the inquiry is whether it is really justifiable, all things
considered, to take the risk. I highlight Hand, Posner, and the Restatement
accounts not to characterize the three accounts of negligence, but rather to
illuminate what they intend to capture by distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable risks. They mean to separate the justifiable from the
unjustifiable risk-taking. In this way, a negligence standard based on not
taking unreasonable risks is a negligence standard demanding that people
refrain taking unjustifiable risks.

65 Id. at 40 (“Negligence is conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing
damage. Due care is conduct which does not involve such a risk.”).
66 Id. at 42-43.

2015]

Reasonableness

2153

If one takes the first route, then one might end up with the Hand
Formula by taking, as the discussion above suggests, an economic conception of reasonableness as rationality. This is not a particularly coherent
view, because the economic conception of rationality as a capacity does not
easily carry over from the individualistic to the aggregative. Posner does not
believe that a person who did not face tort liability for overly risky conduct
would be unreasonable in failing to take it. Indeed, the deterrence argument
in favor of tort liability largely presupposes the rationality of declining to
take precautions (absent tort liability).
We do much better in understanding the appeal and the evolution of the
Hand Formula if we simply look at the Terry-derived version of the Hand
Formula in which reasonable risk is the converse of unreasonable risk, and
unreasonable risk is the failure to take justifiable precautions alongside of
one’s risky activities. This way of thinking about the Hand Formula also
leads nicely to Posner’s economic account of negligence. When one adopts
an efficient deterrence account of the point of imposing liability on
defendants for those costs of their activities that have resulted from their
failure to take justifiable precautions, we understand justifiable risk through
the lens of a monetized version of the Hand Formula.
V. THE MODERATION-BASED ACCOUNT OF REASONABLENESS IN
NEGLIGENCE LAW
In Sleight of Hand,67 following a number of other scholars of tort doctrine, including especially Patrick Kelley and Richard Wright,68 I argued
that Posner’s view is entirely indefensible as an interpretive account of the
breach element in American negligence doctrine. None of the fifty states
define “negligence” (the breach element) in terms of the Hand Formula,
economic or otherwise. They do not utilize the concept of “reasonable care”
in their jury instructions; they use the concept of “ordinary care.” Negligence is not defined for juries in terms of “unreasonable risks;” it is defined
in terms of what a “reasonably careful person” or a “reasonably prudent
67
68

Zipursky, supra note 10.
See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 8, at 591 (discussing the various meanings of the negligence standard); Kelley, supra note 8, at 343-344 (discussing the theoretical origins of the
unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm standard); Wright, supra note 8, at 162-80 (analyzing several
tort cases that Hand adjudicated by applying the formula); see also Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible
Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994) (evaluating the status of the formula in contemporary
cases); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable
Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816-21 (2001) (discussing the Hand Formula
in the context of the Hand factors, the raw data in each case, and the factors’ applicability to the
Hand Norm).
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person” would do.69 When jurors in plain vanilla negligence cases are asked
whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would, they are
being asked to make a certain kind of middle-of-the-road decision. The
standard is not whether the defendant did all she could have done, or what
would have been best to do, or what every last precaution would have been.
There are standards of care like this in negligence law for certain defendants
(e.g., common carriers), but this standard does not apply in the typical
negligence case. In typical cases, what is due is ordinary care, a less stringent
standard of conduct. Similarly, a standard set at conduct displaying indifference to the well-being of others or conduct marking an extreme
departure from ordinary care would be lower than the “ordinary care”
standard. Due care in the normal case, as conventionally understood and as
still represented in jury instructions, lies in between “the highest degree of
diligence and care” and “gross negligence”; that is what “ordinary care” is
supposed to mean. Our system elaborates on this sort of ordinariness by
saying that the jury is to determine whether the defendant acted as “a
reasonably careful person” or “a reasonably prudent person” would have
acted. This might be called the “Moderation View of Reasonableness.”
In terms of tort theory, this picture of breach in American negligence
law is dramatically different from that which our leading tort scholars
(Posner and others) have been saying over the past few decades. Posnerian
cost–benefit analysis is nowhere to be found in this picture. More strikingly, the analytical apparatus of the Hand Formula itself—whether in algebraic form or otherwise—is alien to American negligence law on this account.
In addition, the account does not derive simply from pervasively adopted
jury instructions; it pertains to the duty–breach nexus, the availability in
negligence doctrine of a variety of breach standards other than “ordinary”
care, the place of custom in understanding breach, and several other features
of the law of negligence.70
In light of our analysis in the earlier parts of this paper, we now see
almost a category mistake in the Posnerian account. The principal “reasonableness” cognate in negligence law is adverbial (“reasonably prudent
person”), not adjectival (“reasonable risk”). Its principal role is to qualify
the prudence or carefulness level expected of the actor (to be reasonably
prudent), not to demand the rational defensibility of the risk (to refrain
from taking unjustifiable risks). It connotes non-excessiveness or moderateness in degree, rather than linking to an epistemic or rationality-based
69
70

Zipursky, supra note 10, at 2015–16.
Id. (explaining the failure of the Hand Formula conception to capture an array of features
of negligence law, such as the duty-breach nexus).
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conception. As I have argued elsewhere71 (and will revisit in part below),
there are important consequences to this difference for how cases should be
decided, how law should be taught, how clients should be advised, how legal
scholarship should be done, and how taught law should be conceived.
VI. REASONABLENESS IN NEGLIGENCE LAW: A CRITIQUE OF THE
MODERATION ACCOUNT
A. The Reasonable Person and the Reasonably Prudent Person
An important objection to the Moderation account of Part V is that,
while it may be the case that jury instructions use the adverbial form of
reasonableness (as indicated), there is no denying that the common law of
negligence sometimes utilizes the idea of the reasonable person—what the
court (in a different era) in Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works72 famously
called “the reasonable man.” This prominent phrase involves the term
“reasonable” adjectivally (and even if it did not, it might be odd to rest too
much legal analysis on the adverbial/adjectival distinction). More generally,
lawyers and judges—including judges on appellate courts and judges
deciding motions—utilize the phrase “reasonable person” in talking about
negligence law, even if jury instructions more commonly utilize the phrase
“reasonably prudent person” (or the phrase “reasonably careful person”). It
is, of course, quite tempting to say that the same concept is being used in
both settings, even if the phrases are slightly different. But even if we were
to assume this is so, we would be left with the question of what that concept
is: i.e., is it about a person who exercises reason properly (as the phrase
“reasonable person” might suggest), about a person who is moderately
careful (as “reasonably prudent person” suggests), or about both at once (or
neither)?
The observation of these two phrases next to one another—the
“reasonable person” and “the reasonably prudent person” —suggests the
hypothesis that the “the reasonable person,” as a phrase, might seem to be a
comfortable collapsing of the adverb and adjective in the phrase “the
reasonably prudent person.” In other words, “reasonable” might be short for
“reasonably prudent.” We are thus led to ask what work the concept of
prudence performs within negligence law. Heidi Feldman has observed that

71 See id. at 2026-28 (highlighting the concerns behind whether Hand’s negligence theory
permits “an adequate amount of negligence”).
72 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. 1856).
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prudence is in a sense a virtue concept, like honesty or courage.73 To be
prudent is to be appropriately cautious in one’s action and one’s selection of
courses of conduct. As I have elsewhere suggested, Feldman is not quite
right to depict the “prudence” of negligence law as a virtue, if by “virtue”
she means an excellence of character; negligence law plainly does not aim so
high as to require defendants to excel. This is indeed the point of saying
that negligence law requires, in most cases, only ordinary care (rather than
extraordinary care). It is also the point of saying that it is only required that
the person have acted as a “reasonably prudent” person would, not as a
perfectly prudent person would or as person would if she were an exemplar
of prudence. I have elsewhere contrasted my view with Feldman’s by saying
that the reasonably prudent person possesses something closer to competency
than a virtue; we are looking for conduct that would pass the test for a
driver’s license, not conduct that would qualify for a defensive-driving
medal. With this in mind, I shall call my account a “social-competency”
account of due care in negligence.
The place of prudence in negligence law renders the analysis complex
because some part of being prudent is curtailing one’s conduct appropriately
in connection with potential risks. To the extent that this is true, it is
unsurprising that the concept of a reasonably prudent person is denoted by
the more concise phrase “reasonable person.” However, this hardly shows
that the absence of due care should be analyzed by reference to whether the
degree of risk generated, under the circumstances, satisfies a criterion of
reasonableness understood as optimality or all-told justifiability. It actually
tends to show the opposite: that where “reasonable person” is the operative
phrase, the law really is directing factfinders to consider how a certain kind
of person conducts himself or herself, and it is a person who displays a
moderate level of care (not necessarily an optimal level).
B. Performance and Precautions
A second challenge asserts that the account I put forward works especially well for what might be called “performance” cases of negligence,
rather than “precaution” cases. “Negligence” or “carelessness” sometimes
denotes a substandard performance or execution of an activity, and when
that activity carries risk, substandard or negligent performances of it
generate more injuries. But “negligence” and “carelessness” sometimes
denote a failure to take sufficient precautions in one’s activities. Here an
73 Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2000).
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actor has failed to take measures that would be appropriate for reducing the
risks, measures that a reasonably prudent person would be expected to take.
Evaluation of performance by comparison to a person being reasonably
careful or reasonably prudent seems intuitively comfortable. An image of a
competent performer comes to mind, and the juror is able to compare the
defendant to that actor. Where the asserted negligence lies in a failure to
take precautions, however, the image of the reasonably careful person under
the circumstances may not provide much help. More precisely, if it does
help, it is not principally by virtue of a sort of gestalt sense of what the
conduct of such a person would be like. Rather, it would engage the judgments that might be exercised by such person regarding which precautions
to take. The judgments in question will no doubt concern, at least to some
extent, what kinds of risks need to be minimized, which sorts of precautions
are well suited to doing so, at what cost and with what urgency, and so on.
C. Returning to Unreasonable Risks
Much of the doctrinal writing on negligence law over the past century
has focused on levels of risk rather than on kinds of persons, leading us to
look at “reasonable risk” and “unreasonable risk” in the first instance, rather
than “reasonably prudent person,” “reasonably careful person,” “reasonable
person,” or “unreasonable person.” The Sleight of Hand critique, rehearsed in
Part V, showed that jury instructions pervasively utilize “reasonably
prudent person” or “reasonably careful person,” and do not make reference
to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of risk. I gave these instructions a
central place in determining the content of the positive law. I stand by that
assertion as a substantive matter and I largely stand by it jurisprudentially
and methodologically. Nonetheless, I concede that a critic could fairly
respond as follows: jury instructions are not all there is to the common law,
and a sufficiently broad role of concepts in judicial and lawyerly discussion
of an area of the law can actually constitute part of the law. The place of
unreasonable risk in negligence theory and negligence discourse has reached
this level. It cannot be ignored, but it must be explained, accounted for, and
integrated into an account of breach.74

74 Gregory Keating’s commentary at the Symposium played a large role in persuading me of
this point.
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VII. THE HAND FORMULA REVISITED
A proponent of roughly the Hand Formula conception of breach could
weave together the three criticisms of the moderation account and reconstruct a new Hand Formula account as follows:
Negligence or breach is the failure to conduct oneself as a reasonably prudent person, i.e., a reasonable person, would conduct herself under the circumstances. The
reasonable person standard merely guides us to whether the risk taken was unreasonable. A risk is unreasonable if reason would require that it be reduced by precautions or not taken at all. Put slightly differently, the question is whether the risk
would be unjustifiable if not accompanied by certain precautions. The Hand Formula determines which precautions are required by reason (or required to render
the activity justifiable). It is a function of its burdensomeness, the extent to which it
diminishes the probability of losses, and the magnitude of the losses it makes less
likely. Therefore, the Hand Formula determines which risks are unreasonable and
which risks a reasonable person would have taken, and therefore determines how a
reasonable person would have behaved. It captures the content of negligence, at
least in the domain of precautions negligence; perhaps performance negligence comprises its own little niche. Reasonableness in negligence law is really about justifiability of risk, not about moderation of carefulness in the execution of risky activities.
Whether to take the extra step of monetizing the Hand Formula, as Posner does, is
a separate question.

This is roughly the view taken by the Restatement (Third) of Torts,75
and is in many ways today’s conventional view of the breach standard in
negligence law. As suggested in Part V, it not only fits poorly with jury
instructions, the structure of duty, the concept of ordinary care, and numerous other features of negligence law, it seems to derive from the fundamental mistake of taking “reasonable” to be epistemic and adjectival, rather than
moderation-based and adverbial. Nevertheless, the three challenges above
point to shortcomings in the moderation-based account offered in Part V,
drawing upon features of the language of reasonableness in negligence law
that courts and scholars have taken seriously for over a century. Thus, while
the Restatement may be incomplete and may indeed be remiss for ignoring
various features of negligence doctrine, the Restatement view offers an
integrated account of the core of negligence law, that pertaining to the
negligent failure to take precautions. Or so the argument goes.
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF T ORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (2010).
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The Restatement view sketched above links the reasonable person
standard to the reasonableness of a risk and the reasonableness of taking (or
not taking) a precaution of a certain kind. The actual substance of the
standard travels down a chain that leads, ultimately, to a question about
whether certain risks are unjustifiable absent certain precautions. The
justifiability question is understood to be impersonal; we thus need, roughly
speaking, an impersonal account of which risky (or risk-protective) actions
are justifiable, in the sense of being in accordance with reason. Henry Terry
offered a multifactor test to analyze the justifiability (and, in this sense,
reasonableness) of such risks or actions. Learned Hand offered a simpler
version, which happens to map neatly onto a utilitarian’s expected utility
principle for an aggregate group. Economically oriented thinkers like
Posner have monetized that account.
Reasonableness in the sense of justifiability is, in a curious way, quite
detached from persons. That is a further sense in which it is an objective
idea; let us call this (in an admittedly imperfect phrase) the “impersonal”
aspect of Hand Formula-based reasonableness. There are, on this view,
actions or precautions that reason demands (or forbids). The reasonableness
or justifiability of the risk attaches to it by virtue of its connection with
some criterion or criteria of value. On the Restatement view, it is roughly a
utilitarian, aggregative view of individual welfare. On the economic view,
the aggregative view is specified further by reference to social wealth as the
metric. It is by virtue of qualifying according to such objective criteria that
the precaution (or risk) counts as reasonable, and, in turn, why it can be said
that a reasonable person would take the precaution. Breaching the duty of
care, on this view, is selecting an action or course of conduct that generates,
all told, an unjustifiable level of risk to others. The action’s generating a
certain level of risk to others is what renders it below the line of acceptability because it is unjustifiably risky. There is a sense in which the attribute of
the act that renders it negligent is quite detached from the actor who
performs it. It is the impact on the balance of risk to the actor and others
over benefit to the actor or others that determines whether the conduct has
the quality of negligence. The reasonable person standard, on this view, is
at best a heuristic device for ascertaining whether certain actions have the
quality of generating unjustifiable risk. The quality itself is in an important
sense impersonal, existing apart from any particular person, or even the idea
of a reasonable person.76
76 In one sense, advocates of the Hand Formula conception of breach typically assess the
probability that goes into the risk from the point of view of someone in the circumstances of the
defendant, so it is perhaps not quite as impersonal as I have suggested. Nevertheless, this
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The conception of reasonableness underlying the Hand Formula, as
other scholars have pointed out, is one of instrumental rationality.77 At
least, it is instrumentalistic in the following respect: if we designate aggregate social welfare as an end, then reasonable risk is plausibly understood as
a risk that is justifiable, all considered, because of its connection to the end,
namely, aggregate social welfare. Reasonableness is an attribute of the
precautions that are well designed to serve that end and unreasonableness is
an attribute of risks that are not well designed to serve that end. That is
part of why it is comfortable to translate the language of reasonableness and
unreasonableness, here, to the language of justifiability and unjustifiability.
Of course, a huge qualification is necessary in order to make this work:
the norm of instrumental rationality as to individuals is usually connected
to the interests of the individual alone, not to the aggregate interests of the
community. The Hand Formula and the Restatement view plainly consider
the welfare of all persons. The question is whether the care taken by the
defendant is well-suited to that goal. In this sense, the reasonableness view
of negligence law, so conceived, is actually quite like the reasonable relatedness requirement of constitutional law. The standard looks to the connection between a purported course of conduct and a domain of public welfare.
VIII. THE MODERATION-AND-MUTUALITY CONCEPTION OF
REASONABLENESS IN NEGLIGENCE LAW
A. The Mutuality Conception
Our review, in Part II, of reasonableness in the law included a two-part
discussion of practical reasonableness and practical reason. One sort of
reasonableness usage related to the rational pursuit of ends—in this case,
aggregate welfare. Another sort of reasonableness use is found in a context
of social interdependency. Reasonableness, in these cases, involves a sort of
fair-mindedness and sensitivity to the actual and anticipated demands and
needs of others. We called this a “mutuality-based” sense of practical
reasonableness.78
An obvious question at this juncture is whether a rival, practical epistemic account of negligence can be generated through reasonableness in the
mutuality sense. Recall that the Part VII reworking of the Hand formula
was generated by reference to the concerns of Part VI.A, VI.B, and VI.C:
particular tool is idealized to a significant extent, so that we are still looking at the risk created
apart from the actor.
77 See generally Keating, supra note 7.
78 See supra Part II.
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that reasonableness in negligence law was not simply an adverbial qualifier
of the degree of prudence, but also stood (sometimes) for an attribute or
attitude of persons (like prudence or reasonable prudence); that the reasonably
careful person or the reasonably prudent person idea, conceived in terms of a
moderate degree of carefulness, was not sufficiently illuminating as to
negligence cases involving precautions, even if it was capable of capturing
performance-oriented negligence cases; and that the language of reasonable
and unreasonable risks, although not incorporated in jury instructions and
perhaps not central to the idea of negligence originally, has evolved sufficiently in the discourse of scholars and courts regarding negligence doctrine
that it is untenable to embrace a conception of reasonableness in negligence
law that does not connect with levels of risk.
A mutuality-based conception of reasonableness can address the three
concerns generated in response to the moderation view. First, note that the
phrase “reasonably prudent person” and indeed the phrase “reasonable
person” (as used in Blyth79 and beyond) connotes a person with a positive
attribute (if not quite a full-blown virtue). Of course, we are not making
much progress, analytically, when we say that the reasonable person is the
kind of person who is going to be reasonable and act in a reasonable manner.
Nonetheless, these phrases arguably convey something like “sensible,”
“moderate,” “constrained,” “not wholly insensitive to the demands of
others,” “not wholly selfish and inconsiderate,” and “somewhat fairminded.” The mutuality conception of being reasonable goes some distance
in capturing these ideas. Reasonableness is both an attribute of a kind of
person, here, and also a way a given person can conduct herself at a given
time.
There are, indeed, philosophical debates over whether this attribute
(which most of us find appealing in others) is plausibly counted as an
epistemic power. There are also debates over whether it is actually true to
say that each person has a reason to take others’ needs seriously.80 My point
here is not about moral philosophy but about legal language and legal
concepts. The suggestion is that the phrases “reasonable person” and
“reasonably prudent person” and the concept of a reasonable person connect
with a conception of reasonableness as the capacity to constrain one’s
behavior and choices in a manner that is not wholly insensitive to others’
needs and wishes, but rather displays some sense of mutuality. Put
79
80

Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. 1856).
See SCANLON, supra note 4 (offering a detailed philosophical account of why the impact of
a person’s actions on others can provide a reason for that person to refrain from performing that
action).
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somewhat differently, the common law of negligence entrenches the
principle that being reasonable requires constraining one’s conduct by
reference to the perils one creates for others.
The mutuality sense of reasonableness also connects nicely with the idea
that many questions regarding whether a person was negligent involve
inquiries into whether appropriate precautions against injuring others were
taken. A person who is reasonable in the mutuality sense and acts reasonably will choose to constrain his or her behavior in some fashion so that it is
less likely to injure others. Conversely, to fall below the standard of behaving as a reasonable person would behave—to behave unreasonably—is
commonly a matter of pursuing one’s own chosen activities with inadequate
concern for their impact on others. Consider a landowner who believes the
noise from his neighbors’ wedding for their daughter warrants an award of
damages because it interferes with his quiet midnight gardening. A reasonable landowner would have to tolerate one night’s noise for a wedding. A
person must sometimes clip the edges of his own desire for quiet solitude.
Being reasonable requires a curtailment of what one might really want in
order to accommodate others’ legitimate interests. Similarly, a person’s
desire to get to the fast food restaurant before it closes or to feel the wind
rushing through her hair cannot necessarily be fully indulged. It must be
clipped back, at times, in light of the risk to others’ physical well-being that
comes from fast driving. The precaution of slowing down is what being
reasonable requires, in such an example.
The language of unreasonable risks is in many ways simply the flip side
of the reasonableness of taking precautions. Where being reasonable
demands curtailment of the satisfaction of one’s own desires by precautions
(or desisting altogether), in light of the dangers to others, that is simply an
instance of the unconstrained activity carrying an excessive risk of injury to
others. To take such risks in order to satisfy one’s own desires is to be
unreasonable in the mutuality sense.81
The mutuality conception of reasonableness is superior to the Hand
Formula view in responding to the three concerns raised in Part VI. This is
for several reasons, but for one above all: it takes seriously the concept of
the reasonable person (or the reasonably prudent person) in a way that the
Hand Formula view simply does not. The Hand Formula view does not
even consider the question of what a reasonable person is, or why we would
81 Not all negligent behavior involves a failure of reasonableness in the mutuality sense.
Negligence law also includes a notion of contributory negligence, which involves an inadequate
sense of the risks one is taking with respect to oneself. Those who are unreasonable in this way are
of course “imprudent” in the most literal sense.
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want to use the idea of a reasonable person in determining whether the
defendant was negligent. It is only concerned with the right or appropriate
level of risk—which it defines by reference to aggregate utility (or wealth).
As discussed above, the concept of reasonable risk is detached from anything relating to a reasonable person.82 Of course, the reasonable person
does enter the story, but only in a way that is reverse-engineered. The
reasonable person is one who would not take unreasonable risks, and
unreasonable risks are given content independently.
A second reason for the superiority of the mutuality conception pertains
to the duty element of the tort of negligence and to the basic idea of a duty
of care. The breach element of negligence law is not standalone; it is the
breach of a duty of care that the defendant owes to the plaintiff. That is the
point of Chief Judge Cardozo’s Palsgraf opinion.83 In several articles and a
book, John Goldberg and I have emphasized the relationality of duty and
breach and the centrality of the breach–duty nexus in the analytical structure of negligence law.84 From Heaven v. Pender85 to MacPherson v. Buick86
to Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,87 a core idea of negligence
law is that each of us owes a duty to other individuals to be vigilant of their
well-being. The duty of care is universal in the sense that the duty not to
batter other persons is universal; it is owed to every other person, regardless
of status or prior relationship. When we require people to be reasonable, we
are requiring them to constrain their conduct by reference to its potential
impact on other individuals. The connection between the reasonable person
and a relational duty of care is lost in the Hand Formula conception.
Third, utilizing the mutuality conception of reasonableness for
precaution-oriented negligence cases meshes well with the moderation
conception that best captures performance-oriented cases. I have suggested
above that the consistency of jury instructions, the requirement of ordinary
(as opposed to extraordinary) care within those instructions, and the
adverbial use of “reasonably” to modify “prudent” or “careful” all point to
an understanding of “reasonable” that involves a contrast with excessive82
83
84

See supra Part III.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
See generally JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD I NTRODUCTION TO U.S. LAW : TORTS (2010); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657
(2001); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917
(2010).
85 See 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
86 See 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
87 See 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
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ness.88 That is what was meant by calling the theory moderation-based. The
Hand Formula conception, by contrast, is intrinsically optimizing, and
understands reasonableness in a manner that relates to justifiability, not
excessiveness. While the mutuality conception also seizes upon a quasiepistemic conception of reasonableness, it coheres nicely with the moderation conception. Both the idea of the “reasonably prudent person” at the
core of the moderation conception and the idea of the “reasonable person”
at the core of the mutuality conception are authentic and non-reductive
conceptions of a kind of person; the Hand Formula conception of a reasonable
person is simply reverse-engineered from the idea of reasonable risk. There
is a close connection between the baseline idea that one must at least use
ordinary care toward others (within the moderation conception) and the
idea that a sense of mutuality and a recognition of the other person’s needs
are laudable attributes of a person (within the mutuality conception).
Moderation and mutuality go hand in hand in the reasonable person.
Perhaps this is part of why we have seen so much slippage in the language
of negligence law between “the reasonably prudent person” and “the
reasonable person.”
Finally, it is a merit of the moderation-and-mutuality conception that it
makes room for the possibility that judges and jurors in negligence cases
might sometimes want to reason in ways that resemble the Hand Formula
or a cost-benefit calculus. The Hand Formula conception, by contrast, does
not in any way lead to a mutuality conception. A reasonable person, in the
sense of one who is alive to the ramifications of his or her conduct and
constrains it accordingly, will surely have to make decisions sometimes
about which precautions to take. As I have elsewhere recognized,89 the
Hand Formula factors will typically be highly relevant factors (although not
the only ones) in such a decision, so it would hardly be surprising that who
were reasonable persons (in the mutuality sense) would often be drawn to
thinking in this manner. 90 Relatedly, consider the factfinder trying to
ascertain whether a defendant behaved as a person with a sense of mutuality
would behave. Such a factfinder might well think it illuminating to see
where those factors would lead someone trying to be reasonable. It is not
surprising that the Hand Formula itself derived from a domain of law—
admiralty law—where there are bench trials and judges consequently must

88
89
90

See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.A.
See Zipursky, supra note 10, at 2022-26 (explaining the place for the Hand Formula factors
within a broader conception of the reasonably prudent person standard).

2015]

Reasonableness

2165

explain their conclusions on whether the defendant behaved as a reasonable
person.
B. The Overdemandingness of the Hand Formula Conception of the Duty of Care
Whether one accepts a mutuality-and-moderation conception of
reasonableness, as I have suggested, or the Hand Formula conception, as
Posner has argued for, has major implications for many areas of tort doctrine. Here, I want to call attention to a subtle but nonetheless profoundly
important difference between the Posnerian interpretive view of the
negligence standard and that which I have put forward as the authentic
analysis. It is a difference that is quite ironic at first blush: Posner’s account
of the negligence standard is in some respects more demanding of our
considerateness for others’ safety than what I believe the law of negligence
actually demands. The Hand Formula, given a Posnerian turn, requires that
every person take precautions up to the point at which the safety improvement they provide is offset by its cost. In many scenarios, this will require a
very great investment in safety; in other cases, the Hand Formula may
require rather small investments in safety.
Imagine a person who owns an all-wheel drive SUV, parked in his garage, and a brand new rear-wheel-drive sedan, parked on the street. He
realizes it would probably be somewhat safer to drive the SUV, given the
rainy weather conditions, but he is too lazy to switch cars and he feels like
driving his new sedan anyway. Alas, a cyclist pulls out from behind a truck.
The driver swerves, but hits the cyclist nonetheless. When we invite the
jury to think about whether the driver was negligent, we simply want to
know about how carefully he was driving and how capably he responded in
that moment. Assuming a Hand formula account could accommodate these
questions, it would add another factor: if a plaintiff could argue that the
SUV would have avoided the accident and that the minimal burden of
switching cars would have warranted the change on a rainy night, that
would generate a plausible argument for breach.
But negligence law—at least as to ordinary people—is significantly less
demanding than that. A reasonably prudent person would not think it
necessary to take every last cost-efficient precaution and would not think it
necessary to alter his automobile choice based on the risks to others. The
argument that, if the SUV really would have reduced the risk of accident,
his duty of care required him to switch cars has more than a touch of
unreality. Reasonable people make such choices all the time, and a
plaintiff’s lawyer would be unlikely to suggest otherwise to a jury.
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For a simple reason, negligence law imposes a more modest duty of care
than Posner imagines. Posner is of course a Holmesian who insists on
seeing the law through the eyes of the Holmesian bad man.91 To say that
there is a duty of care from one person to another is, essentially, to recognize that there is the possibility of liability running from one to the other if
the second is able to prove that the first acted in a negligent manner and
thereby injured him or her. Our common law of negligence, by contrast,
treats the duty of care as an actual duty—something members of our community (as a general matter) actually understand themselves to be morally
bound to concern themselves with.92 We, as a society, expect those taking
the driving wheel to be reasonably careful, and when we take the wheel, we
know we are expected to be reasonably careful. The aspiration of our
negligence law is to shield individuals from liability for the accidents they
cause unless they had failed to live up to their duty to be careful towards
others. Part of the reason an injured person has a claim against a driver is
that the driver breached this duty—he or she was not living up to the duty
to be reasonably careful. That is what we mean when we say the driver was
negligent.
A Posnerian conception of negligence is thus in many circumstances
more apt to yield the conclusion that a defendant was negligent. The bar for
reasonable care conceived as optimal care is, in many cases, higher than
ordinary care as I have explained it. My point is that few people, in their
heart of hearts, actually think that they owe optimal care to others as a
primary duty of conduct, even if they do not believe that they are, from a
moral point of view, free to act in a manner that is heedless of others’
interests.93 This does not matter to Posner because the assertion that there
are duties is just the correlative of the assertion that there is liability; it has
no larger implications about how one is obligated to treat others. If,
however, one understands the assertion that there is a duty to behave a
certain way as, in part, an interpretation of only partially articulated
standards of conduct that actually animate the way people think and feel
about their obligations to others, then the idea that one’s duty of care
91

(1997).

See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 993

92 John Goldberg and I have put forward an extended view on the nature of the duty of care
in negligence law, and have done so in tandem with a critique of the instrumentalist view running
from Holmes through Prosser to Posner. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 84.
93 Here, I mean to be making a point analogous to Hume’s observation that we have some
natural generosity for others, but it is somewhat limited. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 602-605 (P.H. Nidditch & L.A. Selby-Bigge eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978)
(1739–1740).
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reaches all the way to optimal care is quite implausible and disorienting. A
conception of the content of the duty of care that is such a poor fit with our
conventional understanding of what we owe to others (by way of care) is
like a self-verifying prophecy: to the extent that we remake negligence law
as a domain that does not mesh with ordinary understanding, the easy
understanding of moral norms as having legal significance begins to fade
away.
C. Reasonableness and Contractualism
Two of the most important critiques of Posner of the past two decades
were written independently by Gregory Keating94 and Arthur Ripstein95 in
the late 1990s. The tort theory work of both has influenced my own.
Moreover, each advanced, prior to my own work on breach, an account of
reasonableness in negligence law that draws from a Rawlsian idea of
reasonableness rather than instrumental rationality. To this extent, Keating’s and Ripstein’s work on reasonableness is, at the very least, a precursor
to my own. Nevertheless, it is crucial to see that there are fundamental
differences between the account I have put forward here and that which
Keating and Ripstein have offered.
Keating’s work is most plainly distinct from my own because he
expressly offers his Rawlsian view as an interpretation of the Hand Formula, rather than rejecting the Hand Formula altogether, as I have done. He
accepts the Restatement (First) and (Second) move of treating the breach
question as one about unreasonable risk, even while he rejects the social
aggregative account of how one ascertains what is an unreasonable risk.
Roughly speaking, Keating believes that an aggregative social welfare
function of the sort put forward by Posner is better at capturing what
rationality (as instrumental rationality) requires than it is at capturing what
reasonableness requires. A Rawlsian framework of reciprocity, equality, and
fairness lies at the foundation of what reasonable persons would expect a
legal system to secure for them. Such a framework, translated to accident
law, would be committed to protecting bodily integrity and liberty sufficiently to permit each individual to pursue his or her own conception of the
good. In many scenarios, however, bodily security is strongly protected in a
manner that is difficult to represent in a Posnerian or utilitarian version of
the Hand Formula. Just as Rawls’s maximin principle ends up producing
the difference principle, which shields the well-being of the least well off, so
94
95

Keating, supra note 7.
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (1999).

2168

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 2131

Keating’s account shields basic goods in a manner that is distinctively nonaggregative and non-utilitarian. In this way, he depicts negligence law as
prioritizing bodily security in a categorical manner, as against dollars and
cents.
Keating’s account suffers from many of the flaws of Posner’s, insofar as
each is an interpretation of the Hand Formula account of reasonableness.
The problem is that the Hand Formula itself is centered on risk level and,
as argued earlier, is therefore quite detached from persons. What I have
argued above, however, is that negligence law itself does not work this way.
It entrusts juries with a reasonable person standard in order to guide them
to a question of how a certain kind of mutuality-respecting individual
incorporates the potential well-being of others into his or her decisions. We
are, in effect, asking juries to make a value judgment, but not one about
which risks ought or ought not be taken. It is a value judgment about what a
person who displayed appropriate care to others, at some level, would do
and think right to do to diminish the risk to others. Although centered, in
some way, in social mores, the question is really a moral one about what
care we owe others. Keating’s is quite different; it is ultimately a political
philosophical question about how a set of legal norms constraining risktaking activity (and allocating the costs of accidents) secures a system of
primary goods within which individuals can create their own lives. My
principal complaint is not to the normative vision, but to the interpretive
power of the account. It simply does not describe what the law asks juries
and judges to focus upon, in the first instance: whether ordinary care was
taken.96
IX. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON REASONABLENESS, REALISM,
AND DOCTRINALISM
This Article puts forward both a negative and a positive thesis about
reasonableness in negligence law. The negative thesis is that neither the
Posnerian version of the Hand Formula nor a softened Restatement version
comes close to capturing the idea of reasonableness in negligence law. This
is for numerous reasons, but perhaps above all because reasonableness in
negligence law serves to focus factfinders on a kind of person—whether a
reasonably prudent, a reasonably careful, or simply a reasonable person—
and not on an attribute of a risk level. In doing so, the Hand Formula has
96 Ripstein’s Rawlsian account, unlike Keating’s, is not centered upon an interpretation of
the Hand Formula. However, it is not principally put forward as an account of what factfinders
are instructed to think about in negligence cases; it is put forward as a way of conceptualizing the
domain of rights that tort law (not just negligence law) protects.
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led many scholars and some judges to miss the core idea that negligence
aims to capture a rather modest moral principle that each of us owes a duty
of ordinary care to others, and that liability in negligence is premised on a
failure to live up to that duty. By shifting to an issue of justified risk level,
the Hand Formula loses touch with this principle. The central critical point
is not normative but interpretive: the language and ideas of negligence
doctrine regarding reasonableness actually lead somewhere and capture
some concepts—they are not simply an invitation to ruminate about
optimal risk levels.
The positive thesis has admittedly evolved in fits and starts, but in the
end, is not really so complicated. Reasonableness in negligence law relates
both to the idea of moderate care and to the idea of mutuality as to others’
needs. Moderation and mutuality is the watchword of negligence law. A very
large aspect of negligence law literally focuses juries on whether a defendant
acted as a “reasonably prudent person” would act under the circumstances.
This instruction unpacks a conception of ordinary care, and while it aims to
eliminate incompetent driving and incompetent performance of one’s risky
activities, it does not demand optimal performance or extraordinary care. In
this sense, we demand of others that they moderate their risky activities and
act in a reasonably careful—quite careful—manner.
Another aspect of negligence law is not fully captured by the adverbial,
non-excessive version of reasonableness, because sometimes negligence law
is really asking what a reasonable person would do, and we are not adequately guided by any preconceptions of what a reasonably careful performance of one’s activity would look like. These cases do involve at least a
quasi-epistemic conception of reasonableness, as the Posnerian argument
suggests, but it is not one of instrumental rationality—it is one of a partially
social conception of reasonableness. The mutuality conception of reasonableness is found in other parts of the law—such as nuisance law—and
throughout ordinary conversation as well. A reasonable person in this sense
is not wholly insensitive to the fact that, like her, others have wishes,
desires, demands, and needs. She has a sense of mutuality. This is a significant part of what the reasonable person or the reasonably prudent person
standard highlights, and it is in this frame of mind that we ask what precautions a reasonable person would have taken or whether the risks taken were
unreasonable. Together, moderation and mutuality come close to capturing
the place of reasonableness in negligence law.
This article began with a broad-ranging survey of the many senses of
“reasonable” and its cognates in the law, the functions that such terms can
play, and the unclarity and uncertainty that comes with the great variety
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and nonspecificity of meanings of “reasonable” and its cognates. One would
wish, of course, for far greater clarity in that section of the article, just as
one would wish for a more singular and crisp account of reasonableness in
negligence law. But a central assertion of the first Part of the article was
that it would simply be an error to infer from the variety of “reasonableness” uses, the vagueness of “reasonable” and its cognates, and the capacity
of “reasonable” to serve as a kind of open-ended site of lawmaking in some
areas of the law that “reasonable” and “reasonableness” are simply
open-ended terms inviting a normative theorist or an ambitious judge to
jump right in and turn theories into law.
The two Parts of this Article fit together in two different ways. Most
obviously, of course, we utilized parts of our survey in Parts I through III in
exploring negligence in the second half. But there is a second connection,
for it is plausible to think that the rise of the Hand Formula in negligence
law is owed, in significant part, to the false inference from the variety and
vagueness of “reasonableness” meanings that the word “reasonable” is
meaningless altogether. The vacuum of meaning wrongly believed to exist
in the reasonableness of negligence law perhaps drew in a clear-seeming
instrumentalist vision like Hand’s, and an economic variation from Posner
as well.
The pliability and vagueness of normative language in the law has of
course long been a motor driving Legal Realism—at least since Holmes’s
classic solicitation of cynical acid in The Path of the Law.97 Yet it is also fair
to say, as Holmes surely recognized, that the comfort of special words with
legalized meanings presents both a powerful draw to doctrinalism, and a
dangerous risk of formalism. Those of us who belong to the cast of the
“New Doctrinalists” would like to think it is possible to avoid the more
egregious aspects of the Legal Realist’s linguistic skepticism without sinking
into rigid doctrinalism. Being thoughtful about reasonableness in the law is
a good place to start.

97 See Holmes, supra note 91, at 995 (“You see how the vague circumference of the notion of
duty shrinks and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and expel
everything except the object of our study, the operations of the law.”).

